CENTER for POLICY STUDIES:
Graduate School of Education and Human Development
DRESS CODES AS A MEANS OF REDUCING VIOLENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS1
Kathleen L. Paliokas
A key policy issue in education today is whether student dress codes, including uniforms, should be used as a means of reducing violence in our public schools (Should Public, 1994). We are currently experiencing a nationwide trend toward adoption of stricter dress codes by public school authorities. The major justifications for these codes are that they will reduce violence by reducing instances in which (1) unsuspecting children wear gang colors or other gang-related attire to school and are threatened or intimidated by opposing gang members as a result (Bishop, 1992; Kukay, 1992); (2) children wearing expensive or fashionable clothes become victims of theft, sometimes by other students (Your Jacket, 1990; Waldmeir, 1994); (3) competition among students regarding clothing turns violent (Russell, 1994); and (4) certain fashion accessories or attire are used as weapons or as a means to conceal weapons (Murphy, 1991; D'Orio, 1994). Other arguments that school officials use to justify dress codes are that they set a more serious tone of respect for the purpose of schools (Majestic, 1991), minimize the distractions of students from their studies due to fashion competition (Deitch, 1995), and lessen the pressure on families to buy expensive popular clothing for their children that they cannot afford (Stover, 1990).
In order to reduce violence in their schools, many school districts have implemented dress codes that prohibit students from wearing a wide range of specific items, including gang-related attire (such as bandannas, nonwhite shoe laces, attire representing professional sports teams, and certain colors), hats, military apparel, combat-style boots, apparel and jewelry that could cause injury, tattoos, and beepers (Murphy, 1991; Kukay, 1992).2 Other school districts have adopted voluntary or mandatory uniform policies that define what students shall wear instead of itemizing attire that they may not wear. This paper will analyze the policy issues surrounding dress codes and uniforms to determine whether a school district should implement a dress code policy as a means of reducing violence in its schools. The paper first examines the major legal challenge to dress code policy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Next, the paper outlines and analyzes the necessary steps to successfully formulate and implement a dress code policy. These steps include: identifying the various stakeholders that should be included in the policy process; looking at the overall advantages and disadvantages of dress codes; assessing the range of specific policy alternatives available; and narrowing those choices to one recommended policy alternative.
Historically, school dress codes have been challenged on one of two grounds: that they violate (1) students' liberty interests to control their personal appearance under the 14th Amendment or (2) students' free expression rights under the First Amendment. Each of these claims is discussed below.
The first dress code cases appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s and involved challenges to hair length restrictions that prohibited male students from wearing their hair long or from having facial hair. In these cases the courts split evenly between upholding and striking down the regulations (Majestic, 1991). The courts that upheld the regulations found that students had no constitutional rights regarding their personal appearance and simply dismissed the cases. The courts that struck down the regulations, on the other hand, recognized a basic liberty interest to control one's personal appearance under the 14th Amendment that deserved some protection. In these early cases, hair regulations were not challenged as infringements of a First Amendment free speech right (Murphy, 1991).
Those courts that strike down dress code regulations under the liberty analysis have found that schools impose unnecessary norms on students. In Bannister v. Paradis, (1970), a federal district court found that school officials' ban against casual clothes simply because they "lead to a relaxed attitude [which] detracts from discipline and a proper educational climate" was insufficient to justify the restriction on the student's right to possess and control his own person (pp. 185, 186). According to the court, school authorities must demonstrate how blue jeans inhibited or tend to inhibit the educational process and may not rely on the assertion of some "nebulous concept of school discipline" (pp. 188- 89).
A more recent court, however, upheld a dress code restriction based on the discipline rationale. In the recent Indiana Court of Appeals case, Hines v. Caston School Corp. (1995), a student challenged a school policy that prohibited male students from wearing pierced earrings. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the student possessed a liberty interest under the 14th Amendment but gave the policy a presumption of constitutionality and placed the burden on the student to show that the policy was not rationally related to a legitimate school interest. The court found that the rule was rationally related to the school's "valid educational function to instill discipline and create a positive education environment by means of a reasonable, consistently applied dress code" that reflected the community's values (Hines, 1995, p. 335).
These two cases demonstrate that even when courts find a liberty interest in personal appearance, they vary in the level of protection they believe it affords students and the amount of deference they will accord school officials.
In the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Supreme Court emphatically asserted that public school students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views in the absence of any constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate" (Tinker, p. 506). Because school officials are "state" or government actors, they are constrained by the U.S. Constitution in regulating speech for disciplinary purposes in the public schools. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the free speech rights of students are not absolute. The States and school officials have a "comprehensive authority, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools" (Tinker, p. 507). This clash between students' individual rights of free expression and the obligation of public school authorities to provide a safe and supportive learning environment is the crux of the debate over dress code policy.
In Tinker (1969). the Supreme Court devised an analytic framework for balancing these competing interests. First, the Court recognized that some nonverbal communication qualifies as "symbolic speech" deserving of First Amendment protection. The Court then distinguished between dress that communicates a political message and thus qualifies as symbolic speech, and dress that does not communicate a message (Grantham, 1994). In order to regulate dress that communicates a political message, school officials must justify their regulation by showing "facts which might reasonably have led [them] to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities" (Tinker p. 514). This includes interference "with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" or "with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone" (Tinker, p. 509). If the dress does not communicate a protected message but merely expresses the individuality of the student, the Court suggested that a much lower level of judicial scrutiny would apply. In these instances, subsequent courts have applied a rational basis test, which permits regulation of noncommunicative dress if school officials can simply demonstrate a rational relationship between the regulation and some educational purpose (Grantham, 1994).
In Tinker (1969), the Court found that black armbands worn by students to protest the Vietnam War constituted symbolic speech worthy of First Amendment protection. Hence, the Court applied its "substantial and material disruption" test to the facts in the case and found that school officials did not prove that they could reasonably expect the black armbands to cause a substantial disruption in operations of the school; the Court also noted that no disruption had in fact occurred. The Court therefore struck down the school regulation as unconstitutional.
The key issue under the Tinker Court's analytic framework is whether the dress at issue is communicative or not. In order to understand how courts have made this determination, it is necessary to review specific factual situations in which the courts have ruled.
Determining whether dress is communicative. In Tinker (1969), the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue of dress that does not communicate a political message (i.e. situations in which officials regulate skirt length, hair style, etc.) In this way, the Court distinguished between communicative and noncommunicative dress and suggested that noncommunicative dress would receive less protection.
Subsequent to Tinker (1969)., the Supreme Court stated that speech is communicative and deserves First Amendment protection when it has "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message ... and the likelihood is great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it" (Spence v. Washington., 1974, pp. 410-11). Determining whether student dress is communicative thus will depend upon the specific circumstances of each case.
Generally, courts have found dress communicative when it involves protest, such as wearing armbands or symbols (like the Confederate flag), or consists of buttons and T-shirts containing messages. In a 1993 case, a California federal district court found that the "wearing of clothing that displays a student's support of a college or university or professional sports team" was speech protected by the First Amendment (Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District, 1993). Another recent case illustrates an instance in which courts have found that dress is not communicative. As part of its anti-gang policy, an Illinois school district prohibited students from wearing gang symbols, including earrings worn by male students (Olesen v. Board of Education, 1987). Darryl Olesen challenged the ban saying his earring was not related to gangs, merely expressed his individuality, and was attractive to young women. The federal district court held that Olesen's "message" of individuality was vague and his First Amendment interest in free expression did not outweigh the school district's interest in curtailing gang activity (Olesen, 1987).
Despite the ruling in Olesen; however, an argument could be made that gang regalia is communicative dress worthy of full First Amendment protection because it communicates the particular message "I am in this gang." Murphy (1991) disagrees, however, noting that while the message conveyed by such attire is particular, it is not "likely that the message would be easily understood" (p. 1333) as required under the Spence test outlined above. Murphy (1991) claims that students would have trouble focusing on the particularized message of gang regalia and would instead tend to "focus on the general threat of violence implicit in the message" (p. 1334). If courts are persuaded by this reasoning, they will most likely find that gang regalia is not symbolic speech deserving of First Amendment protection and simply require school authorities to demonstrate a rational relationship between the dress code and the educational mission of the school (such as maintaining order and discipline).
Once the court has determined if the dress at issue is communicative or not, then it can apply the correct level of scrutiny to the school regulation suppressing it. If the dress is communicative, the standard of review is the Tinker "substantial or material disruption" test. If the dress is noncommunicative, the standard of review is the rational basis test.
Substantial or material disruption standard of review. Once the court has determined that the dress is communicative, it will then apply high scrutiny and demand that school officials demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the dress will substantially disrupt or materially interfere with the educational process. This disruption must be more than a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" and "an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" (Tinker p. 508-09). Subsequent courts rulings have expanded on the interpretation of material disruption that was enunciated in the Tinker case. A federal appeals court in 1971 held in an armband case that schools need not wait until disruption actually occurs before prohibiting disruptive views but must have more than a mere expectation of disruption in order to justify the restriction of students' constitutional rights (Butts v. Dallas Independent School District 1971). School officials must make "a determination, based on fact, not intuition, that the expected disruption would probably result from the exercise of the constitutional right and that foregoing such exercise would tend to make the expected disruption substantially less probable and less severe" (Butts, p. 731).
Three cases indicate the circumstances in which courts will uphold regulations on communicative dress based on the disruption rationale. In Hill v. Lewis (1971), an armband case in which students protested the Vietnam War, a federal district court found the potential for disruption justified the prohibition on the armbands when the high school involved was located in a city with a substantial military population, the war had already been a source of divisiveness among students, and serious disruption had already occurred (including threats of violence, incidents of disrespect to the flag, and belligerent behavior toward teachers). Similarly, a federal court of appeals in Tennessee upheld school officials' right to prohibit a student from wearing a Confederate flag patch on his jacket when disruptions over the symbol had occurred several times during the previous school year (Melton v. Young, 1972). In a third case, a Cleveland district court upheld school officials' blanket ban on buttons and insignia of all type, irrespective of message, unless they were related to school activity, when the high school had been troubled by racial discord for several years and students wore buttons with messages that led to explosive situations (i.e. White is Right, Say It Loud, Black and Proud ) (Guzick v. Drebus, 1969). The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the prohibition was overly broad because it included his antiwar button which was nonprovocative. The court determined that if the school allowed students to wear some buttons but not others further disruption of the educational process would result; furthermore, the court stated that the regulation was valid as long as the school applied the rule uniformly and consistently, and it was reasonably related to prevention of disruption (Guzick, 1969).
In a case relevant to today's attempts to regulate gang-related clothing, a 1970 Colorado federal district court upheld a regulation prohibiting the wearing of black berets to school even though plaintiffs claimed it signified their Mexican heritage (Hernandez v. School District No. One, 1970). In this instance, students wearing the berets had previously engaged in disruptive conduct and the beret had taken on symbolism as intimidation to other students. The court held that the interest in maintaining order outweighed the Mexican American students' rights to make a statement about their heritage. If gang regalia is found to be protected speech, a similar argument regarding disruption could be made: that gang-related clothing represents a form of overt intimidation or an attempt to exert influence and control such that it undermines the disciplinary environment and the authority of teachers. "If the school can document real and substantial problems caused by gang-related clothing, the regulation will likely be upheld" (Murphy, 1991).
In a 1993 case related to gang-related clothing, the court held that school officials did not sufficiently document this nexus. In Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District, (1993), school officials attempted to defend a regulation that prohibited students from wearing clothing bearing collegiate or professional sports insignia. The court struck down the regulation as it applied to elementary schools because school officials "offered no proof at all of gang presence at those schools or of any actual or threatened disruption or material interference with school activities" (Murphy, p. 1461). The court upheld the regulation as it applied to high schools because school officials carried their burden of showing a gang presence, even though undefined, and of "activity resulting in intimidation of students and faculty that could lead to disruptions" (Murphy, p. 1412).
All of these cases indicate that dress that communicates a message can be restricted provided that school authorities have some concrete evidence of past disruptive behavior or a legitimately grounded expectation that it will occur.
Rational basis standard of review. If a court determines that the dress at issue is noncommunicative, it will apply a rational basis test to the school regulation and require school officials to demonstrate some reasonable justification for the restriction. Because this standard of review offers more deference to the decisions of school officials, dress regulations are often, though not always, upheld when dress is found noncommunicative. In some instances, the rational basis test is met by showing that the dress will disrupt the educational process. The level of disruption required, however, is not as exacting as that in the communicative dress cases. In Wallace v. Ford, (1972), the court addresses a detailed dress code enacted by a high school in Arkansas. The court upheld prohibitions on skirts more than six inches above the knee, excessively tight skirts or pants, and revealing, immodest, and suggestive attire on the grounds that they tended to cause substantial disruption. The court struck down restrictions on frayed pants or jeans, tie-dyed clothing, and skirts more than 6 inches below the knee because the school authorities failed to demonstrate how the clothing disrupted the educational mission of the school.
Since Tinker (1969), the Supreme Court has identified two circumstances when school authorities may regulate communicative student dress by merely showing a rational relationship between the regulation and a legitimate educational purpose: (1) when the speech is vulgar, lewd, obscene or plainly offensive; and (2) when it bears the imprimatur of the school.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1985), a high school student named Matthew Fraser delivered a speech at a student assembly endorsing his friend for student body vice president. The speech was laced with sexual metaphor3 and school officials suspended Fraser for violating the school disciplinary rules that prohibited obscene language. The Supreme Court upheld the school's action, stating
"the undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior" (Bethel, p. 681). Such offensive communication "undermines the school's basic educational mission by interfering with teaching of appropriate forms of civil discourse and political expression" (Bethel. p. 685).
The Court also recognized the concern of school authorities acting in loco parentis "to protect children -- especially in a captive audience -- from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech" (Bethel p. 684). The Court found that such utterances were of such slight social value in leading us to the truth that any benefit derived from them was clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality (Bethel, p. 675). School authorities could thus prohibit such speech as undermining the school's basic educational mission without a showing of substantial disruption.
Since the mid-1980s many courts have upheld school dress regulations based on Bethel, asserting that the vulgar manner of student speech violated values of decency, rather than relying on substantial or material disruption.4 The current trend is for courts to defer to school officials regarding determinations of what manner of speech is appropriate in the classroom or school assembly (Zirkel, 1994).
In a second post-Tinker ruling, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Supreme Court held that educators are entitled to exercise greater control over "expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school" (p. 570). While this holding occurred in the context of censoring a student newspaper, it very well may be applicable in instances in which students wear controversial dress while representing the school away from home or during school-sponsored events.
A federal appeals court has summarized the general framework for evaluating regulations of student speech that synthesizes all of the case law outlined above (Chandler v. McMinnville School District. 1992). The court defined three categories of student speech: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech, (2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into neither category (Chandler, 1992). If the restricted speech falls under category (1), courts should defer to school authorities based on the Bethel ruling. If the speech falls under category (2), courts should again accord school officials great deference if the speech could reasonably be seen to bear the imprimatur of the school. If the speech falls into category (3), courts must apply the Tinker analysis and determine if the speech is communicative or not. If it is, the court will require that school officials demonstrate a likelihood that the speech would cause a substantial or material disruption of school activities or would infringe upon the rights of other students. If the speech is not communicative, the court will apply the rational basis test and require school officials to demonstrate a rational relationship between the regulation and some educational purpose (Chandler, 1992).
Because a mandatory-uniform policy dictates what students shall wear rather than merely decreeing what they may not wear, legal analysis of public school uniform policies will differ from that of dress codes. Clearly, uniform policies are a much more extensive restriction on the free expression rights of students and for this reason some courts may be inclined to scrutinize the policy more carefully than in the case of ordinary dress codes. Dress codes are more legally problematic, however, because they single out specific forms of expression and are thus more amenable to claims that officials are suppressing viewpoints with which they disagree. The main question with regard to uniforms is whether students have a constitutional right, under the First or Fourteenth Amendment, to control or express themselves generally through their personal appearance.
Because the widespread interest and enthusiasm for public school uniforms is a recent phenomenon, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of regulations requiring students to wear uniforms in public school. The only known case challenging a uniform policy was heard in Maricopa County, Arizona, in November 1995 (Phoenix Elementary v. Green, 1995). In that case the Arizona state judge upheld a strict mandatory uniform policy that provided no opt-out provision for students. The judge based his ruling on the 1988 Supreme Court case Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which stated that public schools generally are not open public forums in the same way that streets or parks are and that therefore school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on free speech. The Arizona judge looked at the policy reasons that school officials had given to justify the uniform policy (many of the same reasons listed in the introductory paragraph to this paper) and found they were "appropriate matters of concern to the School Board and that the policy itself [was] reasonable" (Phoenix Elementary, 1995, p. 6). The judge also justified his ruling by finding that, on balance, the interests of the entire student body, which were served by the uniform policy, outweighed the free speech interests of those few students who opposed the policy.
The only other relevant cases regarding uniforms involve uniform policies for teachers. In one such case, East Hartford Education Ass'n v. Board of Education (1977), the court upheld a uniform policy for teachers that required a male teacher to wear a tie in class. The court found that the school board had a legitimate concern for "promoting respect for authority and traditional values, as well as discipline in the classroom" (p. 859). The burden was on the teacher to demonstrate that the regulation was so irrational as to be arbitrary, which he was unable to do.
The sparse legal precedent we have so far indicates that courts may be willing to defer to the judgment of school officials if they can provide a rational justification for their mandatory uniform policy. If courts were to find a First Amendment right in general appearance, however, schools would be required to make a stronger showing that the policy furthers an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and that the policy is not more extensive than necessary to achieve that interest.
The above discussion of the constitutionality of dress codes lays out the basic ground rules for drafting such a policy. After researching the background and legal foundations of a potential policy, the next step is identifying the stakeholders who will be affected by the policy.
The three key stakeholders that should be actively involved in the drafting and implementation of a dress code policy are school staff (administrators and teachers), parents, and students. Without collaboration, teamwork and mutual support among these three groups, a dress code policy will not succeed. Other significant players that should also be involved in the process include school board members, state and local politicians, community groups, the American Civil Liberties Union, and local law enforcement officers.
Let's review briefly the role of each stakeholder and why it is important
that they be involved in the process:
Policymakers must build a consensus to the greatest extent possible that reflects the community's wishes and values, particularly those of parents. Without some level of agreement among the stakeholders, a power struggle or clash of priorities may result (Stover, 1990).
After identifying stakeholders, policymakers should familiarize themselves with all the points of view, pro and con, regarding dress codes. Some of this information will come from research related to previous policy initiatives, but most should come from the stakeholders and local participants who are invested in the current process.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DRESS CODES
Parents and educators like dress codes because they are one of the few concrete
means available to combat the increasing level of violence in our public
schools (Bishop, 1992). Proponents of dress codes argue that they can reduce
violence by:
In addition to the above, uniforms minimize violence by:
Opponents of dress codes argue that they:
These arguments demonstrate the balancing that must occur between the state's responsibility to provide a safe and conducive learning environment for public school students and the individual rights of those students to freely express themselves (Lane & Richardson, 1992). In today's climate of increasing violence in the schools, arguably the community's need to ensure the safety and well being of students is strong. Opponents of dress codes would argue, however, that it is these particularly trying times when free speech should be protected all the more intensely.
In determining whether to institute a dress code policy, school districts have 5 basic policy alternatives that run on a continuum from less restrictive to more restrictive. The least restrictive option is not to institute a dress code policy at all, while the most restrictive would be to institute a mandatory uniform policy that does not allow students to opt out. Each alternative is discussed in detail below:
Whether your district needs a dress code will depend on how prevalent violence is in your schools and whether student dress is a factor in that violence. If such a problem already exists or is clearly nascent, then a dress code should be seriously considered. Based on the experiences of other school districts in which violent incidents rose dramatically in a short period of time, it is imperative to plan ahead and develop a policy before crisis management is necessary (Layne & Grossnickle, 1990). Preliminary evidence from districts who have implemented some form of dress codes is that they are effective in reducing gang-related problems, criminal activities, and the number of fights on campus (Bishop, 1992; Davis, 1994). Several of these schools report that after instituting dress codes they saw a decline in absenteeism (Carroll, 1994), the number of weapons and drugs found, and an improvement in academic performance (Kennedy, 1995; Uniforms, 1995). While this data has not been formally documented, the positive results suggest that an investment in the policy development process regarding dress codes is a smart move if violent incidents appear to be on the rise. To do nothing in the face of such a trend may leave districts vulnerable to a lawsuit for not providing a safe and supportive learning environment (Jahn, I990).
The advantage to instituting a general dress code that outlines broad principles
and gives authority to local school staff to formulate and implement a specific
policy is that it:
This option would require training sessions (or at least some form of information dissemination) for local school staff regarding the constitutional limits of dress codes, and strategies for successful policy formulation and implementation. A disadvantage of this option is the time and cost involved in training teachers and administrators to recognize potentially disruptive dress, particularly the subtleties of constantly changing gang apparel. The short term cost of an investment in training, however, may pay off in the long term because staff will be better able to deal with dress code problems as they arise.
This policy option has the advantage of offering simplicity and consistency across the school district. The problem is that its top down approach leaves little flexibility for schools to modify the dress code to their specific local needs. For instance, gang behavior may vary across the district along with types of gang regalia and behavior. An itemized dress code policy therefore should provide some flexibility for local school officials to adapt quickly to perceived needs in their schools and to adjust administrative penalties as necessary. A long lead time would also be heLpFUL so that local schools have time to offer feedback and to build community consensus around the code before it is instituted.
Evidence from prior uniform policy initiatives indicate that before any uniform
policy can succeed, it must have the enthusiastic support of parents (Stover,
1990). This policy alternative represents an excellent way to test the waters
regarding community support for uniforms. Another advantage of this policy
alternative is that because it is voluntary, it does not implicate constitutional
challenges regarding free speech. Finally, while we have very little documented
research about the effectiveness of uniforms in public schools (Long Beach,
1995), preliminary indications are that they have a positive effect on the
learning environment (Uniforms, 1995). Three issues must be addressed if
the voluntary or mandatory uniform policy options are selected:
The constitutional validity of requiring uniforms in public schools is all
but untested; because a mandatory uniform policy without an opt-out provision
completely denies students' liberty in choosing their personal appearance,
courts may require that school officials make a strong showing that the policy
will alleviate safety problems and violence at the school. This policy option
therefore may be risky if the district cannot establish that it has a visible
and serious violence problem. Some school districts require schools to poll
parents and have a certain percentage approve before instituting a mandatory
uniform policy -- for example the Jefferson School District in Louisiana
requires two-thirds of parents approve (Bacon-Blood, 1996) while the Sacramento
City School District requires 60% approve (Sanchez, 1996). If a school district
chooses this option, board members will need to decide a number of issues:
In addition to all of the recommendations included in the policy discussions
above, school districts should consider the following guidelines when drafting
a dress code policy:
In addition to a dress code policy, school districts should develop a comprehensive and systematic plan for school discipline and safety that will involve prevention as well as control. This plan should include a district-wide campaign that will increase public awareness of violence in the schools, educate teachers and administrators regarding intervention strategies in violent situations, and establish networks among law enforcement officers, counselors, juvenile justice workers, and local school staff to increase the effectiveness of discipline policies (Layne & Grossnickle, 1990; Landen, 1992; Should Public, 1994).
The appropriate dress code policy for your school district will depend upon your local circumstances. Preliminary evidence indicates that dress codes and uniforms are successful in reducing violence in our public schools, at least K-8 schools (Long Beach, 1995; Portner, 1996). Trends in constitutional law indicate that courts are willing to defer to school authorities regarding dress policy provided that school officials establish a clear nexus between the dress regulations and furtherance of the educational mission. As long as school officials use common sense and tailor their dress codes to prohibit attire that is reasonably related to ensuring a safe and supportive environment for learning, the regulations are likely to be supported by the courts. In the case of uniforms, the legal situation is less clear. Because uniforms more broadly restrict students' free expression, courts may require more substantial justification that uniforms enhance the learning environment. In drafting a dress code policy for their school districts, school board members must carefully consider a wide range of issues and choose the policy alternative that best meets their needs.
1 Portions of this paper were published previously. See Paliokas, K. L., Futrell, M. H., & Rist, R. C. (1996). Trying uniforms on for size. American School Board Journal, 183(5), 32-35.
2 Additional items that have been banned include sweat pants and jogging suits (which are often identified with drug dealing), leather, fur, muscle shirts, Spandex, underwear worn as outerwear, slippers or flip flops, and halter tops (Jennings, 1989).
4 In at least two cases, courts upheld school officials' prohibition of T-shirts that promoted positive messages because the manner of expression was vulgar. Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992) (upholding a regulation prohibiting a T-shirt that read "Drugs Suck!"); Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993) (upholding a regulation prohibiting a T-shirt that read "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick.").
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